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ABSTRACT 
 
Covert channels is a vital setup in the analysing the strength of security in a network. Covert Channel is 
illegitimate channelling over the secured channel and establishes a malicious conversation. The trap-door 
set in such channels proliferates making covert channel sophisticated to detect their presence in network 
firewall. This is due to the intricate covert scheme that enables to build robust covert channel over the 
network. From an attacker's perspective this will ameliorate by placing multiple such trapdoors in 
different protocols in the rudimentary protocol stack. This leads to a unique scenario of “Hybrid Covert 
Channel", where different covert channel trapdoors exist at the same instance of time in same layer of 
protocol stack. For detection agents to detect such event is complicated due to lack of knowledge over the 
different covert schemes. To improve the knowledge of the detection engine to detect the hybrid covert 
channel scenario it is required to explore all possible clandestine mediums used in the formation of such 
channels. This can be explored by different schemes available and their entropy impact on hybrid covert 
channel. The environment can be composed of resources and subject under at-tack and subject which 
have initiated the attack (attacker). The paper sets itself an objective to understand the different covert 
schemes and the attack scenario (modelling) and possibilities of covert mediums along with metric for 
detection. 
. 
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1.INTRODUCTION 
 
Global internet consists of massive devices connected to it with numerous applications running on 
it.  There is frequent inherent threat of intentional exposure of the confidential and sensitive 
information over secured channel. Such threats are implemented using "Covert Channel" which 
compromises very important attribute "Privacy"of secured channel. Covert channel is defined in 
different ways based on scenarios of establishment of covert channel and is non-concrete.  
 
“An enforced, illicit signaling channel that allows a user to 
surreptitiouslycontravene the multi-level separation policy and un-observability 
requirements of the [target of evaluation]." 
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This clearly states the policy violation constraint, but does not consider whether the 
communication channel was envisaged as a communication channel by the system designer.
simple covert channel can be visua
channel in the communication. 
 
Covertchannelinformationexchangeisbasedcovertlanguagespre
implementation of such language
proliferated into multiple protocols, where each such protocol will be a trapdoor. This makes it 
complex to detect such clan-destine mediums. SETUP a
mechanism for ameliorated development of covert channel. A hybrid covert channel scenario may 
have such multiple trapdoors either in the same layer on in di
 
Multiple trapdoors can be implemented in the same layer or in di
the different covert channel variants at the same instance of time tends to behave as a single 
coherent covert channel. Such channel is 
Channel [3] is homogeneous composition of two or more covert chann
instance of time. Hybrid covert channel may not have strict composition. It becomes complicated 
to assess the composition of the Hybrid Covert Channel.
is depicted in [3] and figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.2. Hybrid Covert Channel in Transport Layer
 
The covert channel was first introduced in the traditional confinement problem as described in 
[11]. Extensive work is carried out in devising the detection methods which can be on real
forensics [6] based. Scenario based analysis of the covert channel detections [3][7] is performed 
to understand the detection better. Monitoring the unusual traffic [14] in the network stream is a 
basis for detection. Modelling the covert timing channel proces
lizedin [3] where channel comprises of both covert and overt 
 
Fig.1. Covert Channel Visualization 
 
-negotiated by the covert users and 
s uses intricate encoding schemes. These schemes may be 
ttack [18] makes uses of multi
fferent layers. 
fferent layers.Implementation 
termed as “Hybrid Covert Channel". A Hybrid Covert 
el variants existing at same 
 An instance of the hybrid covert channel 
 
s as Poisson’s distribution is also a 
 
40 
 A 
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way to detect  such activity. Illegitimate information flows can be tracked through 
Sequence Charts (MSC) [9].This paper employs a statistical protocol based 
to detect hybrid covert channel based on analysis made on packet headers.
 
2.COVERT COMMUNICATION 
 
In Network communication, covert communication amongst a pair of users can take two forms;
(a) covert data exchange and 
(b) covert indication 
 
In covert data exchange, covert data is excha
in rudimentary protocols. This form of covert communication can best be understood with 
pipeline problem, where there exists two pipesp
inside the other such that d2< d1
transportation of crude oil. In Figure 3, the inner pipe p
known or undocumented in the design and used for smuggling oil. The outer pipe p
legitimate pipe. This type of the covert communication type will not have pre
schemes will be simple placement of covert data (trapdoor creation) directly in to the identi
clandestine field in the traditional network protocol 
network covert channel. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Second form of covert communication is the covert indication. Covert users communicate in a 
language not known to others. In Figure 4, the covert s
encoding scheme to leak information. This information encoding scheme as seen from the figure 
1 is the language that covert users employ to communicate in a secured legitimate network 
environment. This sophisticated 
decoding the language might be quite difficult in many situations.
 
The best real time classical example of such commu
leaks the answers to Student Y for an
presence of invigilating officer. For each choice in a question, student X makes a gestur
triggers an event to student Y. For instance to communicate choice A to student Y, student X 
coughs. Same schema holds good
continuous clock events that communicate some form of action to be performed by covert user 
Y.Some of the other forms of covert indication in network scenario 
 
 
 
 
 
entropy 
 
TYPES 
 
nged between the covert users by hiding covert data 
1 and p2 of diameters d1 and d2 respectively, one 
. These pipes are setup between two geographical places for the 
2 of diameter d2 is the covert pipe not 
-defined encoding 
stack. This channel is called as simple 
Fig.3. Classical Pipeline Problem 
ender and receiver share an information 
communication is visible to our detection engine;
 
nication is Examination Problem
 objective type examination paper in an examination hal
 in case network communication where covert user X triggers 
include 
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• Encoding ASCII character set in Sequence number. Decoding the same by applying 
mathematical operation on sequence number. This can either be in TCP or In IP ID fields.
• Repeated sending of acknowledge packet to
is listening to. Receiver has to count the number of time the acknowledge packet was sent 
to this server. This value can later on mapped to ASCII table for retrieving suitable 
character. 
• Retrieving the packet so
information to the covert receiver.
• Using logical operators like the XOR with sequence number to get the covert data.
 
3.COVERT CHANNEL VARIANTS
 
Covert channel are categorized based on 
communication like the shared resource
the communication. The covert channel general classification is given below 
 
• Noisy Covert Channel
both Overt and covert users. 
• Noiseless Covert Channel
parties.  
• Storage Covert Channel
indirectly read or writes in to storage location. 
R/W in hard disk. 
• Timing Covert Channel
modulating the resources in such a way that real response time is observed by the 
receiver.  
• Simple Network Covert Channel
rudimentary protocols used in 
• Steganographic Channel
receiver collude to prevent an observer bein
communication is happening. 
• Subliminal Channel 
typically proved undetectable. 
• Supraliminal Channel
semantic content of cover data, generating innocent communication in a manner 
similar to mimic functions. 
Fig.4. Classical Examination Problem 
 
 an unknown server where the covert receiver 
rting order numbering in IPSec frames which serves as 
 
 
different aspects of the overall entities involved in the 
s, backdoor/trapdoor placement and parties
– 
 [14] is a communication channel which has presence of 
 
 [14] is the communication channel used solely by covert 
 [14] involves the sender and the receiver either directly or 
The implementation can be on file
 [14] [13] involves the sender signalling the information by 
 [14] (SNCC) exists by creating a trapdoor in 
network protocol suite.  
 [3]  is a means of communication where sender and 
g able to reliably detect whether 
 
[15]- is a covert channel in a cryptographic algorithm, 
 
 [12] - A supraliminal channel encodes information in the 
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International Journal of Network Security & Its Applications (IJNSA) Vol.7, No.3, May 2015
 
• Hybrid Covert Channel
covert channels existing at same instance of time. The composition of the Hybr
covert channel is difficult to assess from third party which is trying to detect. 
Mixed composition of covert channel variants behave as single coherent covert 
channel and is of a greatest threat to the legitimate network environment. For 
instance noisy covert channel in transport layer with subliminal channel in 
network layer or application layer.
 
4.ATTACK MODELLING 
 
The attack modelling [4] can be based on different scenarios and placement covert users. Each of 
these scenarios are designed and built t
in direct or encoded format; direct communication is merely placement of covert data over an 
clandestine medium in the network protocol.  Alternatively the covert user can communicate 
using encoding scheme and that is known only to the covert users. 
 
The intricate design, choosing of clandestine mediums (trapdoors) and encoding scheme paves a 
way for successful undetectable 
mediums may be difficult and hence detection metric called covertness index is used.
is given below and will be used for assessment in the attack scenarios.
 
 
 
This important formation scenarios of covert channels where attack can be devised
.  
4.1Scenario - 1 
 
The attack scenarios have three entities 
and Eve is legitimate entity/user. The scenario comprises of the combination of covert and 
legitimate users hence it is scenario of noisy
Bob and Eve is legitimate channel comprising of covert channel and between Alice and Eve is 
covert channel. Alice and Bob have pre
information and is mentioned in dotted lines in the figure 5.
 
While Eve is communicating with Bob over legitimate channel, Alice would extract information 
over the covert channel. Once when the communication between Bob and Eve is over, Alice 
would also stop communication with Bob. Fu
snatched from Bob's machine. The covert channel implemented between Alice and Bob can have 
strong trapdoor so as to thwart the detection methods. Such trapdoors can be designed using 
Hybrid covert channel. Such possible composition can be Subliminal channel in the IPSec and 
Network Covert Channel in the IP, both at network layer.
 
 
 
 
 [4] is co-existence of two or more different variants of 
 
o fulfil certain objectives.  Covert users can communicate 
 
establishment of covert channel.  Detecting such strong covert 
 
 is given below
- Alice, Bob and Eve; Alice and Bob are covert attackers 
 covert channel. The channel established between 
-established channel to communicate the attack 
 
rther Alice and eve can share the information 
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This combination will prove e
The covertness index for Network Covert Channel in Network Layer (IPv4)
where P(T) = Probability ofa trapdoor card
(Ut) = Universal set of all possibletrapdoors
The covertness index for subliminal channel in IPSec 
 
 
IPSec make use of AES-XCBC
implantation - Sequence Number field and padding. The maximum number of rounds in AES 
random number generator algorithm is 16. Out of
seed. 
 
 
As per [7] the trapdoors can be detected under the assumption stated in the hybrid covert channel 
formation. However this will not be the same if multiple trapdoors are set in each of the protocol 
headers. 
 
 
 
Fig.5. Noise Covert Channel 
ffective in hop-to-hop routing and can avoid any detections.
- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- ESP format 
-MAC cipher suite and ESP format allow two trapdoor
 which 5 rounds are used for generating the 
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4.2 Scenario-2 
 
This scenario is built on the threat m
users in sub-network are compromised. This sub
communication from the sub network to all the other networks is built using a Hybrid Covert 
Channel. This sub network can be similar to bot
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.6. Noiseless Covert Channel with Hybrid Covert Channel
 
The scenario can have multi-trapdoor or protocol hopped hybrid covert channel [16]. The 
trapdoor can move from one protocol 
or can be combination trapdoors in multiple level in the protocol suite. Hence there can be no 
particular index. 
 
5.COVERT SCHEMES AND THEIR EMB
 
The covert schemes are crucial for conveying th
obscured way. More sophisticated scheme likely not to be retrieved by detection entity. Few 
samples of covert schemes were discussed in section 2 of this paper and detailed schemes are 
presented here. 
 
Scheme 1 
 
The IP ID is field used for identification of the packet and is used for the routing purpose. The 
covert scheme used for this field is based on following strategy
• Intentional use of only certain IP ID's while having conversation with Covert receiver.
• Scheme is designed by the covert sender for embedding covert characters in to the IP ID 
field. 
• The Covert receiver applies the scheme used by the sender to retrieve the covert 
character. 
 
For instance a simple scheme that can be used for this field is extrac
performing modulus operation of the character set size. General notation for this scheme for 
encoding a character ‘c’ is 
 
odel of noiseless covert channel, where the resources and 
-network is connected to other network. The 
-net as described in [8]. 
 
to another protocol during the hop-to-hop communication 
ODIMENT 
e covert data over communication channel in a 
- 
ting the IP ID is by 
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Where  is the encoding function, R is the IP ID value and n is the size of the character set. 
For an ASCII character set, n = 256 
 
Example: If IP ID = 26702 and if the character to be sent is `M' Then  	 		
 
			 = `M' 
 
To convey a covert message, the covert sender has select IP ID in such a way as to match with 
. 
 
Scheme 2 
 
Another prominent scheme used is on the sequence number where maximum range is 
4,294,967,296 numbers as it is 32 bit field. To communicate covertly under this scheme following 
strategy is employed- 
 
• Sequence number is multiplied with value of character set and bound is declared with 
maximum limit. 
• The receiver side retrieves the sequence number and then divides it by character set size. 
The encoding function  is given below- 
 
 
 
Where S is the initial sequence number and n is the size of the character set. The decoding 
function is  is given below – 
 
 
Where  is the decoded character and 	is the received sequence number. 
 
For instance to send a character `I' covertly over the channel, the sender would have to choose 
1235037038 as sequence number and the max. value is derived as 65535 * 256 = 16777216 
 
Therefore the decoded character is  = 1235037038=16777216 = 73, The value 73 when 
mapped back to ASCII Table is the character `I'. 
 
Scheme 3 
 
Another scheme which has tremendous effect on the bandwidth is the modulation of TCP 
timestamps or use of timing element in the network protocol. TCP timestamps is in the options 
field of the TCP header which indicates the round trip time of the packets. The TCP process 
accurately calculates the next retransmission of TCP segment which was failed to be 
acknowledged. If the character is to be covertly sent using this scheme following strategy is used. 
 
• Get the binary representation of the character and extract bits from the least significant 
bit. 
• Check if the Timestamp least significant bit (LSB) is same as covert bit, if so send the 
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TCP segment. 
• Covert receiver will extract the LSB of the timestamp and store the same until it is a byte. 
 
Let be the binary representation of the character `c' and FLSB(Bc) be the encoding function for 
encoding the covert bits in TCP timestamp. 
 
6.ENTROPY BASED COVERT CHANNEL ANALYSIS 
 
The entropy [2] in communication network indicates the number of bits required to encode a 
character over the channel as stated by Shannon Entropy theory. This is based on the frequency of 
the characters in given string and the size of the alphabet. The entropy measure also checks for 
uncertainty of the random variable. 
 
Let A be finite set of characters such that    and any character  . A is sequence of 
symbols which is a string, each of alphabet in string  A. For instance let cbbacabbac be 
sequence of symbols that needs to be transmitted over network then its sequence of bits represents 
the coded symbol sequence which may be 101110011011100010. Then the entropy for such 
scenario is defined as – 
 
 
 
where	   and   , pi is the probability of the occurrence of symbol ‘c’ in the string and n 
gives the length of the string. To transmit a message “network” over the communication 
network, following are the calculated entropy for each alphabet – 
 
The frequency of all the characters in a string with unique symbols will be same, since the word 
“network” has unique symbols the frequency is 0.143. Let X be string for which the entropy is to 
be calculated, here X may word like network or stream of numbers then 
 
H(X)=[(0.143log20.143) + (0.143log20.143) + (0.143log20.143) +(0.143log20.143) + (0.1
43log20.143) + (0.143log20.143) + (0.143log20.143)] 
 
H(X)=2:803 
 
It requires 3 bits to represent each symbol in the given string and 21 bits are required to represent 
the entire string. Further the appropriate line coding technique has to be chosen to represent them 
in the transmission line. So in general entropy of X where each alphabet is a unique symbol is 
 
 
In a covert channel scenario, the covert user has to be chosen the message in such a way that the 
entropy of string should always be less that number of bits available for that field in the protocol 
header. 
 
i.e.,H(X)<|Maximumnumberofbitsinthatfield(Bf)| 
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The IP ID presented in the scheme 1 of this paper has 16 bits in the IP header, so to send 
X the minimum of 21 bits are required. Hence capacity of the covert channel is
 
The covert channel occupies 25% of total IP header s
header or protocol header simply doubles the covert channel capacity. However the entropy to 
channel capacity ratio will be low thus making it robust ie.,
 
This makes the detection of covert bits much difficult 
fields for analysis. 
 
In general, 
for robust covert channel construction where 
covert channel will be greater than 0.5. The multiple trapdoors through a protoc
protocols is actually setting up of multiple covert channels in the communication network. The 
entropy for such scenarios is dispersed across multiple making it difficult to understand the 
scheme. Also in the scenario of multi
hybrid covert channel where the effect of the entropy is doubled. The below results shown in the 
figure 7 and figure 8 shows the accurate expected behaviour discussed in this paper 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
pace. Multiple trapdoors (t) [5] [4] in IP 
 
 
as the detection systems needs to scan more 
 
 [7]the covertness index for such multi
-trapdoors covert channel behaves like a single coherent 
-
Fig.7. IP Entropy analysis 
 
Fig.8. TCP Entropy Analysis 
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-trapdoor 
ol or set of 
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The results indicate the multiple trapdoors used in hybrid covert channel yields to a higher 
entropy value and low channel to entropy ratio (C/E). The constant C/E ratio also indicates the 
consistent usage of protocol header for constructing multi-trapdoor based hybrid covert channel. 
This implies that the covert schemes used in Hybrid covert channel is difficult detect in secured 
communication. 
 
7.RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
The number of trapdoors implemented in a protocol cannot be all the fields vulnerable in that 
protocol. i.e., 
 
 
 
where Tm is the max number of trapdoors possible in that protocol Ts is the no. of Trapdoors set. 
 
The analysis of the trapdoor setting is performed on protocols like IPv4, TCP and IPSec, 
SSL/TLS. The trapdoor setting in the rudimentary network protocols like the IPv4 and TCP is 
merely based on placing the covert data in any of its header fields. The table 1 shows effect of 
varying the number of trapdoors in IPv4 protocol. 
 
Table1.Multi-TrapdoorAnalysisofIPv4 
 
Sl.No
. 
 
TrapdoorName 
 
No.ofTrap
doors 
 
No.
 o
fTrapdoor
Algorith
m 
 
Covertness
Index 
 
Entropy
 
C/E 
 
1 
 
NetworkCovert
Channel-IPv4-
Single 
4 
 
1 
 
NIL 
 
0.25 
 
2.803 
 
0.089 
 
2 
 
NetworkCovert
Channel-IPv4-
dual 
4 
 
2 
 
NIL 
 
0.5 
 
5.606 
 
0.17 
 
3 
 
NetworkCovert
Channel-IPv4-
triple 
4 
 
3 
 
NIL 
 
0.75 
 
11.21 
 
0.358 
 
 
The graph of Trapdoors Vs the Covertness Index is show in the figure 9 where increase in the 
number of the trapdoors in IPv4 increases the difficulty in detecting the covert channel. The 
trapdoor setting in IPSec using subliminal channel is slightly complex to understand. However 
the ESP format provides two fields to convey the covert bits in the protocol header. The 
remaining data is sent over the ESP algorithm during the time of the key generation for 
encryption using AES algorithm. The residual bits in used in random number generation or used 
in the round box of the AES and this is depicted on row 2 of the table 2. Hence the covertness 
index is 0.15 * equation 2 which is 0.47. This will not change any further as there is limited scope 
for subliminal channel development in IPSec -ESP format. 
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Fig.9. Entropy Vs Covertness Index in IPv4
 
 
Table 2. Multi-
 
 
The graph of Trapdoors Vs the Covertness Index is show in the figure 10 where increase in the 
number of the trapdoors in IPSec ESP makes covertness index constant. The trapdoors in TCP 
based protocol is simple and provides seven fields for placing the covert data. The table 3 depicts 
the changing trapdoor that has an effect on the covertness index. When more number of the 
trapdoors are involved it is difficult to detect the composition of the covert cha
shows change in the trapdoor count that has an effect in the detection. However the changes in the 
covertness index can be minimal. The trapdoor setting in the subliminal channel in SSL/TLS is 
based on the algorithm used in its cipher s
However to increase the complexity of the subliminal to thwart detection the randomization of 
bits is feasible in chosen prime number. This forms Newton
index for such channels is discussed in the table 4
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.10. Entropy Vs Covertness Index in IPSec based subliminal channel
Sl.No. 
 
TrapdoorName 
 
1 
 
SubliminalChan
nel-IPSecESP-1 
 
2 
 
SubliminalChan
nel-IPSecESP-2 
 
3 
 
SubliminalChan
nel-IPSecESP-3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Trapdoor Analysis of Subliminal Channel in IPSec 
nnel. The figure 11 
uite. This is purely called as random oracle channel. 
 Subliminal Channel. The covertness 
 
 
No.ofTrapd
oors 
 
No.
 of
Trapdoorsu
sed 
Algorithm 
 
CovertnessI
ndex 
 
Entropy 
 
C
 
2 
 
1 
 
AES-
XCBC-
MAC 
 
0.15 
 
2.803 
 
0.
 
- 
 
- 
 
AES-
XCBC-
MAC 
 
0.47 
 
4.78 
 
0.
 
- 
 
- 
 
AES-
XCBC-
MAC 
 
0.47 
 
5.21 
 
0.
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Table 3. Multi-Trapdoor Analysis of Network covert channel in TCP
 
Sl.No. 
 
TrapdoorName 
 
1 
 
NetworkCovertC
hannel-TCP-1
2 
 
NetworkCovertC
hannel-TCP-2
3 
 
NetworkCovertC
hannel-TCP-3
 
The graph of covertness index Vs th
12. The higher entropy value for the some of the formation indicates that the detection engine 
[10] is able to detect the activity and this give clear indication of the higher detection rates. 
Hybrid Covert channel is not feasible for the combinations of the Network covert channel in TCP 
and IPv4 as this become easily detectable combination.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.11. Entropy Vs Covertness Index in Covert Channel based on TCP
 
Table4.Multi-
 
Sl.No. 
 
TrapdoorName 
 
1 
 
SubliminalC
hannel(Oracl
e)-
SSL/TLS-1 
 2. 
 
SubliminalC
hannel(Oracl
e)-
SSL/TLS-2 
 3 
 
SubliminalC
hannel(Oracl
e)-
SSL/TLS-3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No.ofTrapd
oors 
 
No.
 of
Trapdoorsu
sed 
Algorithm 
 
CovertnessI
ndex 
 
Entropy 
 
C
 
 
 
7 
 
1 
 
NIL 
 
0.142 
 
2.803 
 
0.
 
 
 
7 
 
2 
 
NIL 
 
0.28 
 
5.606 
 
0.
 
 
 
7 
 
3 
 
NIL 
 
0.42 
 
11.21 
 
0.
 
e trapdoor in the subliminal channel is shown in the figure 
 
 
TrapdoorAnalysisofSubliminalChannelinSSL/TLS 
No.ofTrapd
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No.
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CovertnessI
ndex 
 
Entropy 
 
C
 
- 
 
- 
 
SSLCi-
pherSuite 
 
0.25 
 
2.803 
 
0.
 
- 
 
- 
 
SSLCi-
pherSuite 
 
0.58 
 
3.67 
 
0.
 
- 
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SSLCi-
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0.58 
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Fig.12. Covertness Index for Subliminal Channel based on SSL/TLS
 
8.CONCLUSION 
 
Covert schemes are difficult to understand from third party entity as they obscure the content 
taken in protocol header. This provides an opportunity for embedding any data which may even 
be malware code. Entropy based analysis gives the actual number of bits used to represent the 
covert symbol in a protocol. This gives clearly metric to understand the covert channel schemes 
in a better way. It is unacceptable to have malicious conversation of the network even in presence 
of administrator. It is inference this experiment that the hybri
entropy which makes it difficult to detect. It is required to concentrate on stronger detection 
principle to detect such events. 
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